OPERATIONS AND SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT
Vol. 19, No. 3, 2026, pp. 592 – 608
ISSN 1979-3561 | EISSN 2579-9363

The Interplay between Power, Affective Trust, and Opportunism in Supply Chains: An Integrated View of Transaction Cost Economics and Social Exchange Theory

Thoa Xuan Thi Pham
Faculty of Business and Law, FPT University, Hanoi, Vietnam
Email: thoaptx@fe.edu.vn

Nguyen Ngoc Anh
Faculty of Economics and Management, VNU International School,
Vietnam National University Hanoi, Hanoi, Vietnam
Email: anhngocnguyen@vnu.edu.vn (*Corresponding Author*)

ABSTRACT

This study investigates the relationship between supplier power, affective trust, and supplier opportunism in buyer-supplier relationships. Drawing on transaction cost economics (TCE) and social exchange theory (SET), we propose that different types of supplier power influence the affective trust that purchasing agents place in their supplier agents, and that affective trust, in turn, negatively impacts both weak-form and strong-form supplier opportunism. We employ regression-based mediation analysis using the PROCESS module in SmartPLS 4 to test our hypotheses with survey data gathered from 548 purchasing agents in Vietnam. Our findings reveal that referent and legitimate powers positively influence affective trust, whereas coercive power has a negative effect. Surprisingly, reward power had no significant effect on affective trust. Furthermore, affective trust negatively impacts strong-form opportunism but positively impacts weak-form opportunism. These findings have important implications for academics and practitioners in managing buyer-supplier relationships.

Keywords: *referent power, coercive power, reward power, legitimate power, affective trust, strong form opportunism, weak form opportunism, Vietnam*

1. INTRODUCTION

Opportunistic behavior, characterized by self-serving and deceitful actions, remains a persistent challenge in establishing and sustaining sustainable supply chain relationships (Lumineau & Oliveira, 2020; Rehman *et al.,* 2023). This behavior, driven by factors such as information asymmetry, power imbalances, and cultural differences, can significantly undermine trust, cooperation, and overall supply chain performance (Williamson, 1985). In today's increasingly complex and globalized supply chain networks, the potential for opportunistic behavior is amplified. As supply chains extend across borders and involve a multitude of diverse partners, the risk of unethical and self-serving actions increases (Lumineau & Oliveira, 2020). Such behavior can manifest in various forms, including the misrepresentation of product quality, delayed deliveries, breach of contracts, and intellectual property theft.

The consequences of opportunistic behavior are far-reaching and can have severe implications for both individual firms and entire supply chain networks. Research has shown that opportunistic behavior can lead to decreased trust, reduced information sharing, and lower levels of collaboration (Lumineau & Oliveira, 2020; Trada & Goyal, 2020). These negative outcomes can hinder innovation, increase transaction costs, and ultimately erode firms' competitive advantage (Trada & Goyal, 2020). To address this pressing issue, it is imperative to develop a deeper understanding of the factors that drive opportunistic behavior and explore effective strategies for mitigating its negative effects (Gelderman *et al.,* 2020; Handley & Benton, 2012). By gaining insights into the underlying mechanisms that facilitate or inhibit opportunistic behavior, researchers and practitioners can develop evidence-based interventions to foster more cooperative and resilient supply chain relationships (D. Y. Kim *et al.,* 2024; Nguyen *et al.,* 2022; Siawsh *et al.,* 2021; V. Talavera, 2014).

The study of power dynamics and their influence on opportunism within buyer-supplier relationships represents a critical and evolving area of research in supply chain management (Handfield & Bechtel, 2004; Kahkonen & Lintukangas, 2014; Lumineau & Oliveira, 2020; Taha & Reynolds, 2023). Power imbalances, which arise when one party holds significantly more influence or control than the other, have been shown to significantly impact the likelihood and severity of opportunistic behaviors (Khoja *et al.,* 2011; Zou & Wang, 2022). For instance, a dominant buyer may exploit a weaker supplier by demanding excessive price reductions, imposing unfavorable contractual terms, or withholding critical information from the supplier. Conversely, powerful suppliers may engage in opportunistic actions, such as delaying deliveries, providing substandard products, or leveraging information asymmetries to their advantage (Nguyen *et al.,* 2022; Wang *et al.,* 2015). These behaviors undermine relationship stability and jeopardize supply chain efficiency and sustainability. Understanding how power dynamics manifest in different contexts and how they influence the propensity for opportunism is essential for developing effective strategies to mitigate these risks. By examining the interplay between power and opportunism, researchers can provide actionable insights for practitioners to navigate these complex relationships, foster collaboration (Taha & Reynolds, 2023; Talavera, 2014), and ensure the long-term sustainability of their supply chains (Chen & Chen, 2019).

The impact of power on opportunism in buyer-supplier relationships is multifaceted, with different forms of power exerting varying degrees of influence (Zhang *et al.,* 2022). Referent power, which is based on admiration and respect, can foster trust and collaboration (Zhao *et al.,* 2008), potentially mitigating opportunism. However, its effectiveness may be limited in situations where significant power imbalances exist, as the less powerful party may perceive the relationship as being inequitable. Reward power, defined as the ability to offer incentives (Zhao *et al.,* 2008), can encourage desired behaviors and discourage opportunism. However, an overreliance on rewards may lead to a transactional rather than a collaborative relationship, undermining long-term partnership goals (Terpend & Ashenbaum, 2012). Legitimate power, derived from formal authority or contractual agreements (Zhao *et al.,* 2008), can be used to enforce compliance and ensure adherence to the terms (Leonidou *et al.,* 2019). However, the misuse of legitimate power can breed resentment and resistance, potentially exacerbating opportunistic behavior. Coercive power, the ability to punish or threaten (Zhao *et al.,* 2008), can serve as a deterrent to opportunism but often at the cost of damaging trust and fostering a fearful climate. Understanding the nuanced roles of these power bases in shaping opportunism is crucial for developing strategies to manage and mitigate their negative impacts within buyer-supplier relationships (Terpend & Ashenbaum, 2012; Zhang *et al.,* 2022).

While power dynamics undeniably influence the prevalence and severity of opportunism, the direct link between power and opportunism may be overly simplistic (Han *et al.,* 2022; Wang *et al.,* 2015; Zou & Wang, 2022). This study posits that affective trust, characterized by emotional bonds, mutual regard, and a sense of goodwill (Akrout *et al.,* 2016), serves as a critical mediating mechanism in this relationship. Affective trust can be significantly impacted by power dynamics; when power imbalances are pronounced, the less powerful party may feel coerced or exploited, eroding their trust in the more powerful entity (Handfield & Bechtel, 2004). Conversely, when power is exercised equitably and respectfully, it fosters trust and collaboration, reducing the likelihood of opportunistic behaviors. By examining the mediating role of affective trust, this study aims to provide a more nuanced understanding of how power influences opportunism (Skowronski *et al.,* 2020, 2022). This perspective aligns with recent studies that emphasize the significance of employing both transactional and relational governance mechanisms to mitigate opportunism and enhance supply chain performance (Cao & Lumineau, 2015; Gelderman *et al.,* 2020; Griffith *et al.,* 2006).

Power and trust dynamics are widely recognized as critical determinants of opportunism in buyer-supplier relationships (Handfield & Bechtel, 2004; Zhao *et al.,* 2008). While existing research has extensively explored the broad influence of these factors, it often overlooks nuanced distinctions within opportunistic behaviors. This study addresses this gap by proposing a categorization of opportunism into two distinct forms: strong-form opportunism, characterized by explicit violations of formal contracts, and weak-form opportunism, which encompasses subtle violations of informal agreements or relational norms (Luo *et al.,* 2015). Power imbalances can exert varying degrees of influence on these two forms (Leonidou *et al.,* 2019; Zhang *et al.,* 2022), and trust plays a differential role in mitigating each form (Cao & Lumineau, 2015; Lee & Kim, 2023). Furthermore, weak-form opportunism, which is often subtle and difficult to detect, may still occur in highly trusting relationships. By acknowledging these distinctions and examining the nuanced interplay between power, trust, and the two forms of opportunism, this study aims to provide a more comprehensive understanding of this critical phenomenon and inform the development of more effective strategies for managing and mitigating opportunistic behaviors within supply chains (Handley & Benton, 2012). This study seeks to answer the following research question: How does supplier power influence the development of buyer affective trust and subsequent supplier opportunistic behavior?

This study makes two theoretical contributions. First, our research contributes to the existing literature on opportunism in buyer-supplier relationships by examining how specific sub-dimensions of power, namely referent, reward, coercive, and legitimate power, impact both strong-form and weak-form opportunism. While previous research has examined the impact of power imbalances on opportunism, their findings have been inconsistent (Han *et al.,* 2022; Handley *et al.,* 2019; Pulles *et al.,* 2014). Our study offers a more nuanced perspective by investigating the specific roles of referent, reward, coercive, and legitimate power in shaping both strong-form and weak-form opportunism. By differentiating between these forms of opportunism and considering the multifaceted nature of power, we aim to provide a more comprehensive understanding of how power dynamics can influence the health and sustainability of buyer-supplier relationships. Second, from an integrated view of transaction cost theory and social exchange theory, this study extends the current literature by exploring the interactive effects of power and affective trust in mitigating opportunistic behavior in supply chains. While previous studies have primarily examined the impact of power and affective trust on opportunism separately (Handley *et al.,* 2019; Luo *et al.,* 2015), this study proposes a novel conceptual model that highlights the synergistic relationship between these two constructs.

By comprehending the interplay between power dynamics and trust, our research provides insightful knowledge for practitioners aiming to cultivate cooperative and enduring buyer-supplier partnerships. Particularly relevant to supply chain managers and consultants, this study emphasizes the importance of relational over transactional approaches in nurturing sustainable buyer-supplier partnerships (Taha & Reynolds, 2023). Affective trust, driven by referent and legitimate power, is critical for building resilient relationships. Managers should prioritize cultivating respect and ethical conduct (referent power) and establishing clear roles and decision-making processes (legitimate power) rather than relying on coercive or reward-based tactics that can undermine trust. While strong emotional bonds deter major breaches of trust (strong-form opportunism), they may inadvertently enable minor transgressions (weak-form opportunism) due to complacency. To mitigate this, firms should balance trust building with robust monitoring, clear performance metrics, and open communication. By integrating relational and contractual governance, companies can achieve collaborative, ethical, and resilient supply chains that deliver long-term economic and environmental values (Spekman *et al.,* 1998).

The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides the theoretical background and develops the hypotheses. Section 3 describes the methods used to collect the data and test the hypotheses. Section 4 presents the results of the hypothesis testing. Finally, Section 5 presents the theoretical contributions, practical implications, and limitations of the study, and outlines future research directions.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

As shown in Figure 1, the conceptual model investigates the relationship between supplier power, affective trust, and supplier opportunism. Drawing upon transaction cost economics (TCE) and social exchange theory (SET), the model proposes that different bases of supplier power–namely, referent, legitimate, reward, and coercive power–influence the affective trust that purchasing agents place in their supplier agents (H1-H4). This affective trust, in turn, is hypothesized to negatively impact both weak-form opportunism (H5), characterized by subtle self-interested behaviors, and strong-form opportunism (H6), which involves more overt breaches of trust. Importantly, the model also controls for the duration of supplier cooperation, recognizing its potential influence on the examined relationship. The following sections define the key constructs and provide theoretical justification for the proposed hypotheses.

2.1 Conceptual Definitions

2.1.1 Supplier Power

Power is exercised when one party seeks to influence the actions of another party (Gaski, 1984; Zhao *et al.,* 2008). Within the complex network of supply chain relationships, different types of power play a significant role in shaping interactions and fostering collaboration (Handfield & Bechtel, 2004; Pulles *et al.,* 2014).

In the context of supply chain research, power can be categorized into mediated and non-mediated forms. Mediated power, which includes reward and coercive power, is controlled by the customer, who can influence the manufacturer through positive or negative consequences (Evans & Schilke, 2024; Zhao *et al.,* 2008). Reward power refers to a supplier's ability to influence a buyer's behavior by offering positive reinforcements or incentives for compliance, whereas coercive power refers to a supplier's ability to influence a buyer's behavior by using threats, punishments, or sanctions for non-compliance (Gaski, 1984; Zhao *et al.,* 2008).

In contrast, referent and legitimate power are considered non-mediated because the manufacturer retains control over whether and to what extent it is influenced by a customer (Zhao *et al.,* 2008). Referent power arises from the buyer's admiration, respect, or identification with the supplier. In buyer-supplier relationships, this form of power is often rooted in the supplier's reputation, expertise, or perceived value they bring to the partnership (Clauss & Bouncken, 2019; Gaski, 1984). Meanwhile, legitimate power stems from the buyer's belief that the supplier has the inherent right to influence them, often due to their position, expertise, or contractual agreements (M. Zhang *et al.,* 2022; Zhao *et al.,* 2008). Unlike mediated power, non-mediated power relies on relational and intrinsic factors, fostering a more collaborative and enduring partnership.

2.1.2 Affective Trust

Trust is a critical component of supply chain relationships and plays a significant role in shaping their dynamics and outcomes. In complex and interconnected supply chain networks, trust acts as the glue that binds various stakeholders, including suppliers, manufacturers, distributors, and customers. Mayer *et al.* (1995) define trust as one party's willingness to accept the risk of potential harm resulting from the other party's actions, based on the expectation that the other party will act in their best interests, even in the absence of direct supervision or control. Trust is widely regarded as a vital relational asset that fosters collaboration and strengthens partnerships within the supply chain (Yeung *et al.,* 2009; Zhang & Huo, 2013).

Affective trust stems from the confidence placed in a partner due to a positive emotional connection and feelings of care and consideration (Akrout *et al.,* 2016; Akrout & Diallo, 2017). Rooted in emotional bonds and empathy, affective trust cultivates a sense of security and care within relationships (Dowell *et al.,* 2015; Ha *et al.,* 2011; Johnson & Grayson, 2005). In the initial stages of a business relationship, affective trust tends to play a more prominent role, whereas cognitive trust, although still significant, is less dominant. As the relationship matures, the importance of affective trust may diminish, and cognitive trust, particularly trust in a partner's competence and reliability, becomes increasingly critical (Dowell *et al.,* 2015).

2.1.3 Supplier Opportunism

Opportunism, a central concept in Transaction Cost Economics, is defined by Williamson (1985) as self-serving behavior characterized by deceit and manipulation, including the intentional misrepresentation of information (p. 47). In the context of business exchanges, opportunism occurs when one partner acts in their self-interest, often through deceitful means, to gain an advantage at the expense of the other party (Han *et al.,* 2022). This behavior can manifest in various forms, such as breaching contracts, exploiting power imbalances, withholding critical information, or failing to fulfill commitments (Luo *et al.,* 2015).



Figure 1 Conceptual Model

Building on Williamson's foundational work, Luo (2006, 2007) introduced a nuanced classification of opportunism, distinguishing between strong- and weak-form opportunism. Strong-form opportunism involves the direct violation of explicitly stated contractual terms. This form of opportunism is typically more detectable because it constitutes a clear breach of formal agreements (Zhao *et al.,* 2022). For example, a supplier delivering substandard products or a buyer delaying payments beyond the agreed terms would constitute strong-form opportunism. In contrast, weak-form opportunism refers to the violation of unspoken yet mutually understood relational norms and expectations. This form of opportunism is subtler and harder to identify, as it often involves actions that fall within the "gray areas" of the partnership, such as exploiting information asymmetries or subtly shifting costs to the other party (Luo *et al.,* 2015; Zhao *et al.,* 2021).

2.1.4 The Role of Power & Trust in Managing Opportunism

Social exchange theory posits that individuals engage in interactions based on a cost-benefit analysis. In buyer-supplier relationships, power asymmetries can engender inequitable exchange dynamics, potentially precipitating opportunistic behaviors (Dwyer *et al.,* 1987). For example, a powerful buyer may exploit a less powerful supplier through demands for excessive concessions or by withholding critical information. However, trust is a critical mechanism for mitigating opportunism. Established trust between partners fosters cooperative behavior, transparent information sharing, and mutual investment in the relationship (Mayer *et al.,* 1995).

Transaction cost economics emphasizes the minimization of transaction costs, including those incurred in negotiating, monitoring, and enforcing agreements (Williamson, 1993). Opportunistic behavior substantially escalates these costs by generating uncertainties and eroding trust. Furthermore, power dynamics influence transaction costs, as powerful actors may dictate terms that are advantageous to themselves, thereby imposing higher costs on the less powerful party (Williamson, 1985). Both theoretical perspectives underscore the crucial role of trust in reducing transaction costs and mitigating opportunism by facilitating smoother and more efficient interorganizational interactions.

Prior research suggests that strong relational bonds characterized by high levels of trust and commitment can mitigate the negative effects of power imbalances in buyer-supplier relationships (Dowell *et al.,* 2015; Yeung *et al.,* 2009). Elevated trust fosters cooperation and discourages opportunistic behaviors from both parties, even amidst an uneven power distribution. Similarly, strong commitment cultivates a sense of shared responsibility and interdependence, motivating both parties to prioritize the relationship's long-term success over short-term gains (Han *et al.,* 2022; Handfield & Bechtel, 2004; Kim *et al.,* 2024). In such contexts, power imbalances may exert less influence as both parties are invested in maintaining a mutually beneficial relationship. Moreover, high trust and commitment facilitate open communication and information sharing (Lee & Kim, 2023), enabling effective conflict resolution and addressing potential concerns, thereby mitigating the risk of exploitation by the more powerful party (Jia *et al.,* 2021).

However, another stream of research suggests that in close relationships characterized by high trust and expectations of fairness, power imbalances can paradoxically exacerbate tensions and conflict (e.g., Huo *et al.,* 2019; Vos *et al.,* 2021). When parties are deeply invested and expect equitable treatment, power disparities can engender feelings of grievance and resentment in less powerful parties (Khoja *et al.,* 2011). Elevated trust, which emphasizes cooperation and mutual respect, can further amplify these negative effects. A violation of these trust norms by the more powerful party can severely damage relationships (Huo *et al.,* 2019; Leonidou *et al.,* 2019). Furthermore, maintaining distributive fairness is crucial for establishing healthy relationships. However, in the presence of power imbalances, achieving and sustaining fairness can be challenging, as the dominant party may leverage its position to secure more favorable outcomes. This can generate feelings of inequity and resentment in the weaker party, ultimately undermining the relationship (Chen & Chen, 2019; e.g., Khoja *et al.,* 2011).

Therefore, this study adopts a more nuanced approach to understanding the complex interplay between power, trust, and opportunism in buyer-supplier relationships. We will examine the multifaceted nature of power by analyzing distinct sources such as referent, legitimate, reward, and coercive power. Similarly, we disaggregate opportunism into different forms, such as strong-form opportunism, which involves outright deception and exploitation, and weak-form opportunism, which encompasses more subtle behaviors, such as information withholding or shirking responsibilities. Finally, this study explicitly considers the role of affective trust in mediating the influence of power on opportunism.

2.2 Hypothesis Development

2.2.1 Referent Power and Affective Trust

Supplier referent power, derived from a buyer's admiration for a supplier's reputation, innovative practices, or market leadership, plays a crucial role in cultivating perceived affective trust within buyer-supplier relationships. This influence aligns with the social exchange theory, which posits that positive relationships are built on *reciprocal benefits* and *shared values* (Blau, 1964). When a buyer identifies with a supplier's perceived strengths, they may subconsciously internalize these attributes, fostering a shared sense of identity and purpose (Kwon & Suh, 2004). This identification strengthens the emotional bond, as the buyer perceives the supplier as an extension of their own organization, increasing their willingness to trust the supplier's intentions and actions (Akrout & Diallo, 2017).

Furthermore, referent power triggers positive emotions such as pride and admiration in the buyer, directly influencing perceived affective trust. Associating with a highly regarded supplier can evoke *a sense of pride* and *accomplishment* in buyers. This positive emotional state predisposes buyers to view suppliers favorably and increases their reliance on them (Lee & Kim, 2023). Admiration for the supplier's expertise and capabilities can create a sense of awe and respect, further reinforcing the buyer's trust in the supplier's ability to deliver on promises.

The buyer's desire to emulate and align with the supplier's perceived strengths and values further reinforces this positive emotional bond, leading to increased trust. When buyers view suppliers as role models or aspirational entities, they may seek to emulate the suppliers' success by aligning their own strategies and practices. This aspirational motivation can lead to increased communication (Glas, 2018), information sharing (Elbert *et al.,* 2018), and collaborative behaviors between buyers and suppliers, further strengthening emotional connections and fostering trust (Chen & Chen, 2019). Thus, we propose:

H1: Referent power positively impacts affective trust.

2.2.2 Legitimate Power and Affective Trust

Supplier legitimacy, derived from the buyer's recognition of the supplier's authority and right to influence, can indirectly foster perceived affective trust. This aligns with the social exchange theory, which suggests that perceived *legitimacy in authority* promotes cooperation (Blau, 1964). When buyers perceive the supplier's influence as legitimate, they are more likely to comply with requests and directives (Huo *et al.,* 2017). This compliance, which can lead to positive outcomes, fosters a sense of shared purpose and mutual understanding, indirectly enhancing affective trust. The buyer may interpret the supplier's legitimate power as an indicator of expertise and experience, leading to increased confidence in their judgment and decision-making (Liu *et al.,* 2022). This perception of competence, which is associated with legitimate power, can further strengthen trust.

Moreover, suppliers' legitimate power can reduce uncertainty and perceived risk within the buyer-supplier relationship, positively influencing affective trust. The perceived legitimacy of the supplier's authority can increase the buyer's sense of security within the relationship. This reduction in uncertainty can enhance trust, as buyers feel more confident in the supplier's ability to meet their needs and expectations (Clauss & Bouncken, 2019). Furthermore, buyers may perceive the supplier's legitimate power as a signal of commitment to the relationship, further mitigating perceived risk and enhancing affective trust (Lee *et al.,* 2023).

Finally, legitimate power can influence the development of shared values and norms between the buyer and supplier, indirectly affecting affective trust. When buyers perceive the supplier's authority as legitimate, they may be more inclined to internalize the supplier's values and norms (Clauss & Bouncken, 2019). This shared value system can create a sense of common ground and mutual understanding, fostering a more positive and trusting relationship between the two parties. The buyer may interpret the supplier's legitimate power as a reflection of their commitment to ethical and responsible business practices, further enhancing affective trust (Zou & Wang, 2022). Therefore, the second hypothesis is formulated as follows:

H2: Legitimate power positively impacts affective trust.

2.2.3 Reward Power and Affective Trust

Supplier reward power, derived from the ability to offer valuable incentives, significantly influences perceived affective trust in buyer-supplier relationships. This aligns with the social exchange theory, which suggests that *positive reciprocity* fosters trust (Blau, 1964). When a supplier consistently provides rewards, such as preferential treatment, exclusive access to resources, or favorable contract terms, it cultivates a sense of reciprocity and gratitude in the buyer (Vos *et al.,* 2021). This positive reinforcement strengthens the emotional bond between the two parties, leading to increased affective trust. Buyers may interpret these rewards as genuine expressions of appreciation and commitment to the relationship, further enhancing trust (Evans & Schilke, 2024).

The perceived fairness and equity of the rewards provided by the supplier directly impact affective trust. When buyers perceive rewards as fair and equitable, it reinforces their positive perception of the supplier and strengthens their emotional connection. Conversely, if the buyer perceives the rewards as unfair or inequitable, it can damage the relationship and erode trust. The supplier's ability to distribute rewards fairly and equitably demonstrates their integrity and respect for the buyer, fostering a more trusting and collaborative relationship (Huo *et al.,* 2017).

Furthermore, supplier reward power can act as a positive motivator, encouraging the buyer to perform their best and strengthen the relationship. When buyers receive valuable rewards for their performance or contributions, it reinforces their motivation to continue working closely with the supplier and achieve mutual success. This positive reinforcement can create a virtuous cycle of trust and collaboration, as the buyer's positive experiences with the supplier further strengthen their emotional connection and willingness to rely on the supplier (Kim & Lee, 2024). Thus, we posit that:

H3: Reward power positively impacts affective trust.

2.2.4 Coercive Power and Affective Trust

Supplier coercive power, based on the threat of punishment or negative consequences, can significantly erode perceived affective trust in buyer-supplier relationships. This aligns with the social exchange theory, which suggests that perceived *coercion undermines trust and cooperation* (Blau, 1964). The use of coercive tactics, such as threats of contract termination or the withholding of critical resources, creates an atmosphere of fear and distrust (Zhang *et al.,* 2020). This undermines the foundation of trust, as buyers may perceive suppliers' actions as manipulative and self-serving rather than genuine and collaborative (Lee & Kim, 2023). The use of coercion can also damage the sense of reciprocity and mutual benefit, as the buyer may feel compelled to accept unfavorable terms or conditions (Liu *et al.,* 2022).

The use of coercive power can trigger negative emotions, such as fear, anger, and resentment in the buyer, further eroding affective trust. When buyers feel threatened or pressured by suppliers, it can create a negative emotional environment that hinders the development of a trusting and collaborative relationship. The buyer may become defensive and resistant to the supplier's influence, making it difficult to establish a strong and enduring partnership between the two parties. Negative emotions associated with coercive power can also lead to counterproductive behaviors, such as withholding information or engaging in opportunistic actions (Skowronski *et al.,* 2022).

Moreover, coercive power can damage the supplier's reputation and have long-term negative consequences for buyer-supplier relationships. When buyers perceive suppliers as coercive and manipulative, it can damage the suppliers' reputation and erode buyers' trust in their integrity and ethical conduct (Skowronski *et al.,* 2022). This can lead to communication breakdowns, increased conflict, and ultimately, the dissolution of relationships. The negative consequences of coercive power can also extend beyond the immediate relationship, as buyers may be reluctant to engage with other suppliers who exhibit similar behaviors (Siawsh *et al.,* 2021). Hence, we hypothesize that:

H4: Coercive power negatively impacts affective trust.

2.2.5 Affective Trust and Weak-form Opportunism

In the field of management, cooperation, and mutual support during the operation of a company, trust affects many aspects in many aspects, with great significance in the interaction with other parties. Trust is beneficial to supply chain management and has a positive impact on performance outcomes in supply chain contexts (Johnston *et al.,* 2004; Zhang & Huo, 2013). In the aspect of supply chain relationships, trust is a crucial factor in buyer-supplier relationships and plays a crucial role in securing stability and endurance in buyer-supplier relationships.

First, affective trust, rooted in strong emotional bonds and mutual respect, acts as a moral deterrent against weak-form opportunism. When buyers genuinely trust their suppliers, they view them as partners, rather than adversaries. This fosters a sense of shared responsibility and a desire to maintain positive relationships. Suppliers, recognizing the buyer's trust and the potential damage to the emotional bond, are less likely to engage in behaviors that could violate this trust, such as withholding critical information or shirking their responsibilities. The expectation of reciprocity and the desire to maintain a positive and mutually beneficial relationship can significantly reduce the likelihood of opportunistic behavior (Dowell *et al.,* 2015; Ha *et al.,* 2011).

Moreover, affective trust facilitates open and honest communication between buyers and suppliers. In high-trust environments, both parties feel comfortable sharing information, discussing concerns, and collaboratively resolving issues. This open communication milieu reduces the need for costly and inefficient formal control and monitoring mechanisms. Research on communication in supply chains highlights the positive role of trust in facilitating information exchange and collaborative problem solving (Elbert *et al.,* 2018; Glas, 2018).

Third, affective trust fosters a collaborative environment in which buyers and suppliers work together to achieve mutual goals. When trust is high, both parties are more willing to invest time and resources in joint problem solving and innovation. This collaborative approach reduces the likelihood of opportunistic behavior, as both parties focus on achieving shared objectives rather than pursuing individual self-interest. The shared commitment to success and strong emotional bond between the parties create a powerful incentive to act ethically and cooperatively, minimizing the risk of weak-form opportunism (Dyer & Singh, 1998). Thus, we propose that:

H5: Affective trust negatively impacts weak form opportunism.

2.2.6 Affective Trust and Strong-form Opportunism

Similarly, affective trust acts as a powerful moral deterrent against strong-form opportunism, which involves blatant violations of formal agreements. When buyers trust their suppliers, they view the relationship as a long-term partnership founded on mutual respect and shared values (Akrout & Diallo, 2017). Recognizing this strong emotional bond, suppliers are less likely to engage in behaviors that could severely damage the relationship, such as deliberately breaching contracts or fraud. The desire to maintain this positive emotional connection and the long-term sustainability of the partnership outweighs the short-term gains from opportunistic behaviors (Dowell *et al.,* 2015).

Additionally, affective trust fosters a collaborative environment in which both buyers and suppliers are more inclined to engage in joint problem-solving and conflict resolution. When trust is high, both parties are more willing to communicate openly and honestly, discuss disagreements constructively, and work together to find mutually acceptable solutions to problems. This proactive approach to conflict resolution reduces the likelihood of disputes escalating into costly and damaging legal proceedings (Vos *et al.,* 2021). The shared commitment to maintaining a positive emotional connection and the long-term sustainability of the partnership encourages both parties to find amicable solutions to problems, minimizing the need to resort to contract violations (Elbert *et al.,* 2018).

Table 1 Respondent Demographics (n = 548)

Characteristics	Frequency	%
Job position		
Executives	13	2.4
Manager	105	19.2
Unit manager	98	17.9
Purchasing agents	331	60.4
Other	1	0.2
Company size (employees)		
Under 50	71	13.0
50-100	298	54.4
100-200	128	23.4
More than 200	51	9.3
Supplier cooperation duration (years)		
Under 1	102	102
1-5	193	193
6-10	230	230
More than 10	23	23
Industry sectors		
Raw materials (Mining & quarrying, agriculture, forestry & fisheries)	33	33
Manufacturing and Construction (Construction, manufacturing, utilities supply)	142	142
Services (Telecommunications, transport & postal services, import & export, wholesale & retail, and so on)	373	373

Table 2 Full Collinearity Test

	AT_atta*	AT_secu*	WFO	SFO	CP	LP	RP	RWP
VIF	1.259	1.807	1.074	1.406	1.588	1.093	2.285	1.753

Note: VIF, Variance inflation factor; AT_secu, Affective trust – security dimension; AT_atta*, Affective trust – attachment dimension; WFO, Weak-form opportunism; SFO, Strong-form opportunism; CP, Coercive power; LP, Legitimate power; RP, Referent power; RWP, Reward power.*

Finally, affective trust can significantly impact a supplier's reputation and its long-term viability in the market. When buyers trust their suppliers, they are more likely to recommend them to other businesses, which can enhance the supplier's reputation and attract new customers to the supplier. Conversely, engaging in strong-form opportunism can severely damage a supplier's reputation, leading to business losses and long-term financial instability (Liu *et al.,* 2018). Suppliers who value their reputation and long-term success are less likely to engage in behaviors that could jeopardize their relationships with trusted buyers. The desire to maintain a positive reputation and ensure the long-term sustainability of their business can act as a strong deterrent to strong-form opportunism. Thus, we propose the following hypothesis:

H6: Affective trust negatively impacts strong-form opportunism.

3. METHODOLOGY

3.1 *Population and Sampling*

This study aims to examine the role of power and affective trust in mitigating opportunism in buyer-supplier relationships at the individual level. Therefore, the targeted respondents were purchasing agents or employees responsible for purchasing within companies.

This study employed a snowball sampling technique to reach suitable respondents through personal and professional networks. Data collection was conducted through online self-administered surveys, which allowed researchers to reach a broader audience at minimal cost and ensured the confidentiality of information (Van Selm & Jankowski, 2006). Data were collected from February to March 2024, resulting in 555 responses. After screening for outliers and questionable responses, a final dataset of 548 usable responses was obtained. The respondents' demographics are presented in Table 1.

3.2 Non-response Bias & Common Method Bias

Non-response bias was addressed using procedural remedies and statistical assessments. To improve response rates, we used persuasive invitations, follow-up reminders, and anonymity assurances (Clottey & Grawe, 2014). We further assessed non-response bias by comparing early (first 20%) and late respondents (last 20%), with the latter serving as a proxy for non-respondents. Independent-samples t-tests revealed no significant differences, indicating that non-response bias is unlikely to threaten the results.

Common method bias (CMB) was addressed using established procedural and statistical remedies. Procedurally, the survey emphasized the study's purpose and avoided sensitive items to reduce evaluation apprehension (Podsakoff *et al.,* 2003). We conducted a full collinearity test by introducing a random marker variable (Kock & Lynn, 2012). As reported in Table 2, all variance inflation factor (VIF) values were below the 3.3 threshold, suggesting that CMB is not a major concern (Kock & Lynn, 2012).

3.3 Measurement

The construct measurement items were adapted from previous studies to develop a questionnaire for this study. The original questionnaire was developed in English; therefore, a back-translation approach (Brislin, 1970) was used to translate it into Vietnamese. This ensured semantic equivalence between the original and translated versions. To assess the constructs, participants were asked to indicate their level of agreement with the statements using a five-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).

3.3.1 Supplier Power

This study focuses on four dominant types of supplier power in supply chain contexts, including two non-mediated types of power: referent and legitimate power, and two mediated types of power: reward and coercive power (Zhao *et al.,* 2008).

Supplier *referent power* refers to a supplier agent's ability to influence its partners based on the attractiveness of its business practices, values or reputation (Zhang *et al.,* 2022; Zhao *et al.,* 2008). This construct was measured using three questions adapted from Zhao *et al.* (2008). These measurement items capture purchasing agents' positive perceptions of their suppliers' business values and practices and operational philosophy (Cox *et al.,* 2001; Zhao *et al.,* 2008). In this study, it measures the extent to which a firm's major customer admires and seeks to emulate the firm's business practices, identifies with the firm's values and operational philosophy, and willingly conforms to the firm's wishes and suggestions, driven by a positive perception of the firm's competence, a shared perspective on business conduct, and respect for the firm.

Supplier *legitimate power* refers to the perceived authority a supplier holds in a supply chain relationship, often stemming from their position, expertise or contractual agreements (Zhang *et al.,* 2022; Zhao *et al.,* 2008). This construct was measured using four questions adapted from Zhao *et al.* (2008). These measurement items capture a sense of duty, obligation, and acceptance of authority (Cox *et al.,* 2001; Zhao *et al.,* 2008). In this study, we measure the extent to which a buyer perceives a duty to comply with the supplier's requests, acknowledges the supplier's inherent right to influence their decisions, and demonstrates a willingness to accept the supplier's recommendations.

Supplier *reward power* refers to a supplier's ability to influence a buyer's behavior by offering positive reinforcements or incentives for compliance (Gaski, 1984; Zhao *et al.,* 2008). This construct was measured using four questions adapted from Zhao *et al.* (2008). These measurement items capture the perceived benefits of compliance, the potential costs of non-compliance, and the supplier's active use of incentives, providing a comprehensive understanding of how reward power operates in buyer-supplier relationships (Gaski, 1984; Zhao *et al.,* 2008). In this study, the authors measured the extent to which a buyer perceives that compliance with the supplier leads to rewards, non-compliance leads to penalties, and the supplier actively uses rewards to shape their behavior.

Supplier *coercive power* refers to a supplier's ability to influence a buyer using threats, punishments, or sanctions for non-compliance (Gaski, 1984; Zhao *et al.,* 2008). This construct was measured using four questions adapted from Zhao *et al.* (2008). These measurement items capture the perceived threat of punishment, potential for negative consequences, and the supplier's active use of coercion (Gaski 1984; Zhao *et al.* 2008). In this study, the authors measured the extent to which a buyer perceives that the supplier will punish non-compliance, actively uses threats to influence their behavior, and is willing to use punitive measures to maintain control.

3.3.2 Affective Trust

This study focuses on the most influential type of supply chain trust, affective trust, which is arguably significant for establishing and sustaining sustainable relationships (Akrout *et al.,* 2016; Akrout & Diallo, 2017). Affective trust is operationalized as a multi-dimensional construct, consisting of security and attachment dimensions.

The security dimension was measured using three questions adapted from Akrout and Diallo (2017). These measurement items capture a feeling of comfort, confidence, and mutual respect within the relationship, where partners feel assured of fair treatment and lack anxiety about the partnership (Akrout *et al.,* 2016). In this study, they measured the extent to which partners feel confident in receiving fair treatment, experience a sense of comfort and ease within the relationship, and hold mutual respect for one another.

The attachment dimension was measured using three questions adapted from Akrout and Diallo (2017). These measurement items capture a strong emotional bond, where partners feel a personal connection that transcends the professional realm and involves tangible expressions of care and investment in the relationship (Akrout *et al.,* 2016). In this study, we measured the extent to which partners feel a strong personal connection, experience a sense of loss at the prospect of relationship dissolution, and actively invest in the relationship through emotional gestures and shared experiences.

Table 3 Factor Loadings, Reliability and AVE for First Order Constructs

Code/No.	Question Items	λ	VIFs
RP	**Referent Power**, adapted from Zhang *et al.* (2022) α = 0.869; CR = 0.892; AVE = 0.789		
RP1	We really admire the way our major customer runs its business, so we try to follow its lead.	0.921	3.632
RP2	We generally want to operate our company in a way that is very similar to the way we think our major customer would.	0.865	1.740
RP3	Our company does what our major customer wants because we have very similar feelings about the way a business should be run.	0.878	3.253
LP	**Legitimate Power**, adapted from Zhang *et al.* (2022) α = 0.701; CR = 0.754; AVE = 0.610		
LP1	It is our duty to do as our major customer requests.	-	-
LP2	We have an obligation to do what our major customer wants, even though it is not a part of the contract.	0.812	1.325
LP3	Since it is the customer, we accept our major customer's recommendations.	0.873	2.297
LP4	Our major customer has the right to expect us to go along with its requests.	0.640	1.862
RWP	**Reward Power**, adapted from Zhang *et al.* (2022) α = 0.708; CR = 0.745; AVE = 0.614		
RWP1	If we do not do what our major customer asks, we will not receive very good treatment from it	-	-
RWP2	We feel that, by going along with our major customer, we will be favored by it on some other occasions	0.807	1.152
RWP3	By going along with our major customer's requests, we have avoided some of the problems other suppliers face	0.780	1.933
RWP4	Our major customer often rewards us in order to get our company to go along with its wishes	0.765	1.886
CP	**Coercive Power**, adapted from Zhang *et al.* (2022) α = 0.715; CR = 0.808; AVE = 0.640		
CP1	Our major customer's personnel will somehow get back at us if they discover that we did not do as they asked	0.654	1.188
CP2	Our major customer often hints that it will take certain actions that will reduce our profits if we do not go along with its requests	-	-
CP3	Our major customer might withdraw certain needed services from us if we do not go along with its requests	0.811	1.826
CP4	If our company does not agree with its suggestions, our major customer could make things more difficult for us	0.914	1.969
AT	**Affective Trust**, adapted from Akrout and Diallo (2017)		
AT_ Security	*Security* dimension α = 0.805; CR = 0.918; AVE = 0.705		
AT1	I am sure that it will always make me its best offer.	0.828	1.903
AT2	I feel very at ease in my relationship with it.	0.893	1.554
AT3	I have great respect for it and vice versa.	0.795	1.922
AT_ Attachment	*Attachment* dimension α = 0.727; CR = 0.727; AVE = 0.646		
AT4	I have strong emotional links with him/her.	0.787	1.303
AT5	If I could no longer work with him/her, I would feel that I have lost a personal relationship.	0.828	1.650
AT6	We have both made considerable emotional investments (Christmas, get-well cards…, dinners/lunches…) in our professional relationship.	0.795	1.519
WFO	**Weak-form Opportunism**, adapted from Luo *et al.* (2015) α = 0.806; CR = 0.984; AVE = 0.692		
WFO1	He/she withholds from expending full effort in our cooperative relationship.	0.916	1.585
WFO2	He/she may hide critical information in order to benefit at our expense.	0.844	2.021
WFO3	He/she refuses to make adjustments in response to our requirements.	0.724	1.816
SFO	**Strong-form Opportunism**, adapted from Luo *et al.* (2015) α = 0.810; CR = 0.906; AVE = 0.709		
SFO1	He/she is deceptive when sharing critical information required by our contract.	0.902	1.754
SFO2	He/she fails to invest in sales and human resources as required by our contract.	0.719	1.667
SFO3	He/she tries to increase their own gain by evading contractual obligations.	0.892	2.120
SFO4	He/she sometimes violates contractual terms and conditions.	-	-

Note: -, eliminated items; λ, factor loadings; α, Cronbach's Alpha; CR, composite reliability; AVE, average variance extracted.

Table 4 Discriminant Validity Assessment for the First Order Constructs

	AT_Atta*	AT_Secu*	SFO	WFO	CP	LP	RP	RWP
Panel A: Fornell-Larcker criterion								
AT_Atta*	0.804							
AT_Secu*	0.506	0.840						
SFO	-0.239	0.003	0.842					
WFO	0.097	0.315	0.268	0.832				
CP	-0.255	-0.426	0.080	0.266	0.800			
LP	0.511	0.590	-0.039	0.379	-0.142	0.781		
RP	0.599	0.433	0.107	0.148	-0.311	0.237	0.888	
RWP	0.635	0.070	-0.067	-0.039	-0.079	0.180	0.587	0.784
Panel B: Heterotrait-Monotrait Ratio (HTMT)								
AT_Atta*								
AT_Secu*	0.574							
SFO	0.312	0.165						
WFO	0.205	0.312	0.481					
CP	0.352	0.521	0.185	0.427				
LP	0.787	0.686	0.234	0.374	0.185			
RP	0.739	0.420	0.270	0.314	0.383	0.332		
RWP	0.816	0.385	0.317	0.256	0.256	0.461	0.792	

3.3.3 Opportunism

This study operationalizes opportunism as a multi-dimensional construct constituting weak-form and strong-form opportunism (Luo *et al.,* 2015).

Weak-form opportunism was measured using three questions adapted from Luo *et al.* (2015). These measurement items capture the lack of commitment, selective information sharing (Elbert *et al.,* 2018), and resistance to accommodation by the supplier (Luo *et al.,* 2015). In this study, we measure the extent to which a partner in a buyer-supplier relationship demonstrates a lack of commitment to collaboration, engages in selective information sharing, and resists accommodating the other party's needs.

Strong-form opportunism was measured using three questions adapted from Luo *et al.* (2015). These measurement items capture deceptive practices, contractual violations, and exploitative behavior (Luo *et al.,* 2015). In this study, we measure the extent to which a partner in a buyer-supplier relationship engages in deception, violates contractual obligations, exploits loopholes for self-gain, and demonstrates a pattern of breaching agreements.

4. RESULTS

To assess the measurement models, this study employed partial least squares structural equation modeling (PLS-SEM) using the SmartPLS 4 software. This approach is appropriate for modeling higher-order constructs and handling non-normal data (Guenther *et al.,* 2023). The evaluation followed the established procedures and criteria outlined by Hair *et al.* (2019) and Hair *et al.* (2022). Also, this study employed a regression-based approach using the PROCESS approach proposed by Andrew F. Hayes (2018) in SmartPLS 4 to test the proposed hypotheses, particularly the mediation effects. This approach is well-suited for estimating indirect effects, as it employs bootstrapping procedures to generate bias-corrected confidence intervals that do not require the assumption of normality for the sampling distribution of indirect effects (Sarstedt *et al.,* 2020).

4.1 Measurement Test

4.1.1 Validating First Order Construct Measurement Model

Confirmatory Composite Analysis (CCA) was adopted to validate the first-order construct measurement model by assessing indicator reliability, internal consistency reliability, convergent validity, and discriminant validity (Hair *et al.,* 2020). The validation results are summarized in Table 3.

The discussion of results should focus on the interpretation rather than repeating information from the Results section. Here, authors are encouraged to again link to the discussion to the existing literature for making comparisons, if deemed appropriate.

Indicator reliability. This reliability was evaluated by examining the outer loadings of the measurement items. As shown in Table 4, the majority of the outer loadings exceeded the recommended threshold of 0.708 (Hair *et al.,* 2011, 2022). Although two items, legitimate power (LP4) and coercive power (CP1), had slightly lower loadings of 0.640 and 0.654, respectively, these values are considered acceptable within the context of newly adapted measures for supply chain management researchs (Hulland, 1999).

Internal consistency reliability. Cronbach’s alpha and Composite Reliability (CR) were used to assess construct reliability. Both indices have a recommended cutoff value of 0.70 (Hair *et al.,* 2019). As indicated in Table 4, all constructs demonstrated Cronbach’s alpha and CR values exceeding 0.70, supporting their internal consistency reliability.

Convergent validity. It was assessed using the Average Variance Extracted (AVE), with a cutoff value of 0.5 (Hair *et al.,* 2020). Table 4 reveals that all constructs had AVE values above 0.5, indicating that convergent validity was established.

Discriminant validity. Discriminant validity was assessed using two well-established methods: the Fornell and Larker criterion (Fornell & Larcker, 1981) and the Heterotrait-Monotrait (HTMT) ratio of correlations (Henseler *et al.,* 2015). As presented in Table 4, Panel A, the Fornell and Larcker criterion was satisfied, as all inter-

Table 5 Factor loadings, Reliability and AVE for a higher-order construct – Affective Trust

Items	Higher Order Construct	λ	VIF
Affective Trust, adapted from Akrout and Diallo (2017). α = 0.672; CR = 0.677; AVE = 0.752			
AT_Secu*	Security dimension	0.852	1.344
AT_Atta*	Attachment dimension	0.882	1.344

Note: AT_Secu, Affective trust – security dimension; AT_Atta*, Affective trust – attachment dimension; CR, Composite Reliability; AVE, Average Variance Extracted.*

Table 6 Results of Regression Analysis Using PROCESS

	Coefficients	T Statistics	P Values	f^2	Results
Model Summary					
R^2_{AT} = 0.642 (t=21.458, p = 0.00)					
R^2_{SFO} = 0.025 (t=1.665, p = 0.04)					
R^2_{WFO} = 0.047 (t=2.813, p = 0.02)					
Proposed Hypotheses					
H1: RP → AT	0.430	8.997	0.000	0.097	Supported
H2: LP → AT	0.593	10.973	0.000	0.708	Supported
H3: CP → AT	-0.196	7.033	0.000	0.225	Supported
H4: RWP → AT	0.007	0.131	0.448	0.000	Not supported
H5: AT → WFO	0.213	3.904	0.000	0.027	Not supported
H6: AT → SFO	-0.187	3.422	0.000	0.025	Supported
Control Variables					
SupDur → WFO	0.067	1.264	0.103	0.002	
SupDur → SFO	0.104	1.801	0.036	0.007	

Note: f^2, effect size; RP, referent power; LP, legitimate power; CP, coercive power; RWP, reward power; AT, affective trust; WFO, weak-form opportunism; SFO, strong-form opportunism; SupDur, supplier relationship duration.

construct correlations were lower than the square root of the Average Variance Extracted (AVE) for each corresponding construct. In addition, the HTMT ratios displayed in Panel B were all below the recommended threshold of 0.9 (Henseler *et al.,* 2015), further supporting discriminant validity.

4.1.2 Validating Second Order Construct Measurement Model

Affective trust is conceptualized and operationalized as a higher-order reflective construct based on two dimensions: security and attachment. Table 5 presents the factor loadings, reliability, and Average Variance Extracted (AVE) for this higher-order construct. Both dimensions exhibited strong loadings on the higher-order construct, with 0.852 for the security dimension and 0.882 for the attachment dimension. Moreover, the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) for both dimensions was 1.344, suggesting no significant multicollinearity issues.

The overall reliability of the higher-order construct was assessed using Cronbach's alpha and Composite Reliability (CR). Both indices were slightly less than the recommended threshold of 0.70 (Hair *et al.,* 2019), indicating relatively good internal consistency reliability for the newly adapted measure (Hair *et al.,* 2019). Furthermore, the AVE value of 0.752 exceeded the recommended threshold of 0.50, supporting the construct's convergent validity.

4.2 Hypothesis Testing

The results of the hypothesis testing are presented in Table 6.

Hypothesis 1. H1 examines the extent to which the referent power of the buyer can influence the affective trust of the supplier cast on buyer in the supply chain. The results in Table 6 show that referent power has a positive effect on affective trust (β = 0.430, t = 8.997, p = 0.000, f2 = 0.097). Thus, H1 is supported.

Hypothesis 2. H2 examines the extent to which the legitimate power of the buyer can influence the affective trust of the supplier cast on buyer in the supply chain. The results in Table 6 show that legitimate power has a positive effect on affective trust (β = 0.593, t = 10.973, p = 0.000, f2 = 0.708). Thus, H2 is supported.

Hypothesis 3. H3 examines the extent to which the buyer's coercive power can influence the supplier's affective trust in the buyer in supply chains. The results in Table 6 show that coercive power has a negative effect on affective trust (β = -0.196, t = 7.033, p = 0.000, f2 = 0.225). Thus, H3 is supported.

Hypothesis 4. H4 examines the extent to which the buyer's reward power can influence the supplier's affective trust in the buyer in supply chains. The results in Table 6 show that reward power has no effect on affective trust (β = 0.007, t = 0.131, p = 0.448, f2 = 0.000). Thus, H4 is not supported.

Hypothesis 5. H5 examines the mitigating effects of affective trust on weak-form opportunism. The results in Table 6 show that affective trust has a positive effect on weak form opportunism (β = 0.213, t = 3.904, p = 0.000, f2 = 0.027). Thus, H5 is not supported.

Hypothesis 6. H6 examines the mitigating effects of affective trust on strong-form opportunism. The results in Table 6 show that affective trust has a negative effect on strong-form opportunism (β = -0.187, t = 3.422, p = 0.000, f2 = 0.025). Thus, H6 is supported.

4.3 Post-hoc Analysis

The post-hoc analysis results are presented in Table 7. This post hoc analysis aims to explore the mediating role of affective trust in the relationship between buyer power and opportunism. The bootstrapping results indicate that affective trust mediates several relationships between power and opportunism, with distinct patterns across strong-form and weak-form opportunism.

Table 7 Results of Post-hoc Mediation Analysis Using PROCESS

Indirect Effects	Coefficients	SD	T Statistics	P Values	Confidence Interval	
					UL	UU
LP → AT → SFO	-0.111	0.032	3.425	0.000	-0.164	-0.058
LP → AT → WFO	0.126	0.035	3.571	0.000	0.072	0.188
RP → AT → SFO	-0.080	0.026	3.079	0.001	-0.125	-0.041
RP → AT → WFO	0.092	0.026	3.584	0.000	0.053	0.137
RWP → AT → WFO	0.002	0.012	0.126	0.450	-0.018	0.022
RWP → AT → SFO	-0.001	0.011	0.127	0.449	-0.016	0.017
CP → AT → SFO	0.037	0.013	2.792	0.003	0.018	0.060
CP → AT → WFO	-0.042	0.012	3.612	0.000	-0.064	-0.025

Note: SD, standard deviation; LL = lower bias-corrected bootstrap 95% confidence interval; UL = upper bias-corrected bootstrap 95% confidence interval; RP, referent power; LP, legitimate power; CP, coercive power; RWP, reward power; AT, affective trust; WFO, weak-form opportunism; SFO, strong-form opportunism.

First, the results reveal the statistically significant indirect effect of two non-mediated powers – legitimate power and referent power – on both strong-form and weak-form opportunism through affective trust. Specifically, legitimate power is negatively associated with strong-form opportunism via affective trust (β = -0.111, t = 3.425, $p < 0.001$, 95% CI [-0.164, -0.058]) but positively associated with weak-form opportunism (β = 0.126, t = 3.571, $p < 0.001$, 95% CI [0.072, 0.188]). Similarly, referent power has a negative indirect effect on strong-form opportunism (β = -0.080, t = 3.079, p = 0.001, 95% CI [-0.125, -0.041]) and a positive indirect effect on weak-form opportunism (β = 0.092, t = 3.584, $p < 0.001$, 95% CI [0.053, 0.137]).

Second, the results indicate a statistically significant indirect effect of mediated power, specifically coercive power, on both strong-form and weak-form opportunism, mediated through affective trust. Coercive power exhibits a significant indirect effect on both strong- and weak-form opportunism via affective trust. The indirect effect is positive for strong-form opportunism (β = 0.037, t = 2.792, p = .003, 95% CI [0.018, 0.060]) and negative for weak-form opportunism (β = -0.042, t = 3.612, $p < 0.001$, 95% CI [-0.064, -0.025]), indicating differential behavioral consequences. In contrast, reward power does not exhibit significant indirect effects on either strong-form opportunism (β = −0.001, t = 0.127, p = 0.449, 95% CI [−0.016, 0.017]) or weak-form opportunism (β = 0.002, t = 0.126, p = 0.450, 95% CI [−0.018, 0.022]), as the confidence intervals include zero.

In summary, the findings indicate that affective trust significantly mediates the effects of coercive, legitimate, and referent power but not reward power, with indirect effects varying in direction (negative vs. positive) between strong- and weak-form opportunism.

5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

5.1 Discussion of Empirical Findings

Our findings reveal some interesting findings for further discussion. First, our findings revealed that two types of non-mediated power – referent and legitimate power have significant positive effects on affective trust. This finding reveals that non-mediated power, specifically referent and legitimate power, significantly enhances affective trust in buyer-supplier relationships. This suggests that, beyond contractual obligations or financial incentives, building relationships based on respect, admiration, and recognized authority fosters emotional connections and trust. These findings align with previous research emphasizing the importance of relational factors in collaborative buyer-supplier relationships (Handfield & Bechtel, 2004; Robb *et al.,* 2022). By cultivating these non-mediated power sources, companies can strengthen long-term supplier relationships and foster collaborative environments.

Second, our findings indicate that only one type of mediated power – coercive power–has a significant negative effect on affective trust, while reward power has no significant effect on affective trust. This finding demonstrates a nuanced understanding of the power dynamics in buyer-supplier relationships. While coercive power negatively impacts affective trust, reward power has no significant effect. This suggests that punitive measures erode trust, while the promise of rewards alone is not enough to foster a genuine emotional connection. This aligns with the literature highlighting the limitations of transactional approaches and the importance of relational governance mechanisms in achieving collaborative outcomes (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Robb *et al.,* 2022). This implies that building affective trust requires a more *holistic approach* that goes beyond simply offering rewards, emphasizing the need for fairness, transparency, and genuine partnerships in sustainable buyer-supplier relationships.

Third, affective trust has a significant negative effect on opportunism in the strong-form but a significant positive effect in the weak form. These findings reveal the fascinating duality in the impact of affective trust on opportunistic behavior. While strong emotional bonds deter major breaches of trust (strong-form opportunism), they can paradoxically increase minor opportunistic actions (weak-form opportunism). This seemingly counterintuitive finding suggests that close relationships can create blind spots, allowing small transgressions to go unnoticed or unchallenged. This resonates with research on the "*dark side*" of close relationships in supply chains (Anderson & Jap, 2005). This implies that a balanced approach combining trust and vigilance is essential for mitigating opportunism and building sustainable buyer-supplier relationships. One plausible explanation is that high levels of affective trust reduce monitoring intensity and increase relational tolerance

(Dowell *et al.,* 2015; Johnson & Grayson, 2005), thereby creating conditions in which minor or ambiguous deviations are less likely to be detected or sanctioned. While such trust helps deter overt self-serving violations, it may simultaneously relax safeguards against subtle opportunistic behaviors. At the same time, this counterintuitive effect may partly reflect a suppression or specification issue arising from the interplay among governance mechanisms; therefore, the finding should be interpreted with caution and warrants further investigation.

Fourth, the post-hoc analysis revealed intriguing findings that warrant further investigation. Legitimate and referent powers have an indirect negative impact on strong-form opportunism and an indirect positive effect on weak-form opportunism through affective trust. These findings imply that power-based governance mechanisms operate in nuanced and differentiated ways across forms of opportunism. Specifically, while legitimate and referent power - by fostering affective trust - can effectively curb overt, self-serving violations characteristic of strong-form opportunism, they may simultaneously create relational conditions that tolerate or even enable more subtle, ambiguous behaviors associated with weak-form opportunism.

Fifth, the post-hoc analysis revealed that reward power has no effect on both strong-form and weak-form opportunism; indeed, only coercive power has an indirect positive effect on strong-form opportunism and a negative effect on weak-form opportunism. These findings suggest that not all power bases function equivalently to control opportunistic behavior. The null effect of reward power implies that incentive-based mechanisms may be *insufficient to deter opportunism*, particularly when such behaviors are driven by self-interest and strategic considerations rather than calculative cost or benefit trade-offs (Huo *et al.,* 2019). In contrast, coercive power has a paradoxical dual effect. Its indirect positive association with strong-form opportunism suggests that the use of threats or sanctions may erode relational quality and trigger resistance or retaliatory behavior, thereby increasing the likelihood of overt opportunistic acts (Huo *et al.,* 2017; Zhang *et al.,* 2020). Conversely, its negative relationship with weak-form opportunism indicates that coercive mechanisms may be effective in suppressing minor or ambiguous deviations through increased monitoring and fear of penalties.

In summary, these post-hoc findings highlight the nuanced and sometimes countervailing role of affective trust as a mediating mechanism in controlling opportunistic behavior. While legitimate and referent power, via affective trust, help reduce strong-form opportunism, they may simultaneously increase vulnerability to weaker, more subtle forms. This points to a fundamental governance trade-off, in which mechanisms that strengthen relational bonds and curb severe opportunism can inadvertently weaken safeguards against low-level opportunistic behavior. Accordingly, affective trust should be understood as a contingent rather than a uniformly beneficial mechanism, with effects that vary across forms of opportunism. This highlights the need to complement trust-based governance with appropriate formal controls to ensure a balanced and effective approach.

5.2 Theoretical Contributions

The present study helps resolve the *controversies* on the role of power and trust in mitigating supplier opportunism due to *inconsistent* empirical findings in the extant literature. The present study resolves these controversies by (1) integrating TCE and SET to examine both *transactional* and *relational* mechanisms (i.e., power and trust) in controlling supplier opportunism and (2) adopting *a granular view* of power and trust to examine their effects at the dimensional level on two distinct types of opportunism: weak-form and strong-form.

First, by integrating both TCE and SET perspectives, this study enriches the extant literature on mitigating supplier opportunism by examining the effectiveness of both transactional (i.e., coercive and reward power) and relational mechanisms (i.e., referent and legitimate power, affective trust) in controlling supplier opportunism (Kwon & Suh, 2004). Notably, this study advances the theory by identifying affective trust as a central mediating mechanism through which power-based governance influences opportunistic behavior. The findings show that referent and legitimate power enhance affective trust, which in turn reduces strong-form opportunism but does not effectively constrain weak-form opportunism. This highlights the contingent and differentiated role of affective trust, suggesting that relational governance operates unevenly across opportunism forms. This study extends prior research by demonstrating that the effectiveness of combining transactional and relational mechanisms depends not only on the type of governance employed but also on the form of opportunism being addressed (Kahkonen & Lintukangas, 2014; Robb *et al.,* 2022; Talavera, 2014).

Second, by adopting *a granular view* of power, trust, and opportunism, this study goes beyond the traditional view of power by identifying and analyzing specific dimensions of power crucial for fostering or hindering affective trust, in turn mitigating opportunism in the context of the supply chain. This study delves deeper into the nuanced effects of referent power, legitimate power, coercive power, and reward power on opportunism in business-to-business relationship within this specific cultural and business environment. Ultimately, it not only acknowledges the existence of different types of power but also reveals how different power structures influence trust and opportunism in supply chains, contributing to a more holistic understanding of how power dynamics shape the collaborative environment characterized by high affective trust and low opportunism (Handley *et al.,* 2019; Jia *et al.,* 2021).

5.3 Practical Implications

This study offers actionable insights for practitioners managing sustainable buyer-supplier relationships to build stronger, more resilient partnerships. First, the finding that referent and legitimate power significantly drive affective trust underscores the importance of moving beyond transactional exchanges. Supplier managers and agents should focus on cultivating respect and admiration (referent power) by demonstrating their expertise and ethical conduct. Simultaneously, establishing clear roles, responsibilities, and decision-making processes (legitimate power) builds a foundation of trust based on the recognized authority. To establish and maintain a strategic partnership where shared goals and mutual understanding are essential, supplier agents should recognize that fostering a genuine emotional connection through relational governance (Dyer & Singh, 1998) is key rather than relying solely on contractual clauses or financial incentives (Robb *et al.,* 2022).

Furthermore, this research highlights the limitations of purely transactional approaches. While coercive power clearly damages trust, the surprising non-significance of reward power suggests that simply offering incentives is insufficient to build affective trust. Managers should be wary of over-reliance on "carrots and sticks," as they may not translate into genuine commitment, especially in the context of complex business exchanges. Instead, a more holistic approach emphasizing fairness, transparency, and open communication is needed (Spekman *et al.,* 1998). This includes actively involving the buyer in strategic planning, co-creating solutions, and fostering a sense of shared purpose. By focusing on relational factors and moving beyond transactional exchanges, companies can unlock the true potential of collaborative and sustainable buyer-supplier relationships, achieving both economic and environmental benefits (Nguyen *et al.,* 2022; Robb *et al.,* 2022). This resonates with calls for relational contracting and collaborative governance in supply chains (Rehman *et al.,* 2023; Robb *et al.,* 2022), emphasizing the long-term value of trust and mutual commitment in such relationships.

Second, the finding that affective trust reduces strong-form opportunism (major breaches of trust) confirms conventional wisdom: strong emotional bonds act as a powerful deterrent against significant transgressions. This reinforces the importance of cultivating deep, trust-based relationships, particularly in the context of complex business exchanges, where collaboration and information sharing are critical (Khoja *et al.,* 2011; Kim *et al.,* 2024). However, the counterintuitive finding that affective trust can increase weak-form opportunism (minor opportunistic actions) offers crucial practical insights. This suggests that close relationships can breed *complacency*, creating *blind spots* where small transgressions, such as subtly prioritizing one's own interests or cutting corners on reporting, may go unnoticed or unchallenged. This aligns with the "dark side" of close relationships, emphasizing that familiarity can sometimes breed not contempt, but a subtle erosion of vigilance (Anderson & Jap, 2005; Lumineau & Oliveira, 2020).

For managers and consultants, this implies that building trust is not a panacea for all forms of opportunism. While fostering strong emotional bonds is essential, it should be coupled with robust monitoring mechanisms, clear performance metrics, and open communication channels. This balanced approach allows for leveraging the benefits of trust while mitigating its potential downsides. Specifically, establishing clear ethical guidelines, conducting regular audits (even within trusted relationships), and encouraging a culture of open feedback can help prevent minor transgressions from accumulating into larger problems. In supply chains, where transparency and accountability are paramount, this balanced approach is critical for building resilient and ethical partnerships. This echoes calls for "smart trust" in interorganizational relationships, where relational and contractual governance mechanisms are combined for optimal outcomes (Robb *et al.,* 2022).

5.4 Limitations and Future Research Directions

While this study offers significant insights into the governance mechanisms of power and trust and their impact on opportunism within Vietnamese supply chains, it has limitations that warrant further exploration. First, the R^2 values for weak- and strong-form opportunism are relatively low, indicating that the model explains only a limited proportion of the variance in these outcomes. This suggests that opportunistic behavior is likely influenced by a broader set of structural, contextual, and relational factors that are not captured in the present model. Accordingly, the findings should be interpreted as providing *incremental* rather than *comprehensive* insights. Future research should incorporate additional antecedents, such as governance mechanisms, environmental uncertainty, and exchange characteristics, to enhance the model's completeness and predictive relevance. Second, the research's focus on the Vietnamese context limits the generalizability of its findings to other countries with different cultural and business landscapes. Future research should investigate how power dynamics and business-to-business collaboration vary across different geographical and cultural contexts. Third, from a *dyadic* perspective, the study focuses on the relationship between individual purchasing and supplier agents, limiting its exploration of the complex network dynamics often present in business-to-business exchanges. Future research could employ network analysis techniques to map power dynamics within broader business-to-business collaboration networks.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This research is funded by FPT University under grant number DHFPT2026-27.

CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

The authors declare no conflicts of interest regarding the publication of this article.

DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENTS

The data that support the findings of this study are available from the corresponding author upon reasonable request.

REFERENCES

Akrout, H., & Diallo, M. F. (2017). Fundamental transformations of trust and its drivers: A multi-stage approach of business-to-business relationships. *Industrial Marketing Management, 66*, 159–171. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.indmarman.2017.08.003

Akrout, H., Diallo, M. F., Akrout, W., & Chandon, J.-L. (2016). Affective trust in buyer-seller relationships: A two-dimensional scale. *Journal of Business & Industrial Marketing, 31*(2), 260–273. https://doi.org/10.1108/JBIM-11-2014-0223

Anderson, E., & Jap, S. D. (2005). The dark side of close relationships. MIT Sloan Management Review, 46(3), 75–82.

Blau, P. (1964). *Exchange and Power in Social Life*. Wiley.

Brislin, R. W. (1970). Back-translation for cross-cultural research. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 1*(3), Article 3. https://doi.org/10.1177/135910457000100301

Cao, Z., & Lumineau, F. (2015). Revisiting the interplay between contractual and relational governance: A qualitative and meta-analytic investigation. *Journal of Operations Management, 33–34*(1), 15–42. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jom. 2014.09.009

Chen, Y., & Chen, I. J. (2019). Mediated power and sustainable supplier management (SSM): Linking power use, justice, and supplier performance. *International Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics Management, 49*(8), 861–878. https://doi.org/10.1108/IJPDLM-12-2018-0393

Clauss, T., & Bouncken, R. B. (2019). Social power as an antecedence of governance in buyer-supplier alliances. *Industrial Marketing Management, 77*, 75–89. https://doi. org/ 10.1016/j.indmarman.2018.12.005

Clottey, T. A., & Grawe, S. J. (2014). Non-response bias assessment in logistics survey research: Use fewer tests? *International Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics Management, 44*(5), 412–426. https://doi.org/10.1108/ IJPDLM-10-2012-0314

Cox, A., Ireland, P., Lonsdale, C., Sanderson, J., & Watson, G. (2001). *Supply Chains, Markets and Power* (0 ed.). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203299272

Dowell, D., Morrison, M., & Heffernan, T. (2015). The changing importance of affective trust and cognitive trust across the relationship lifecycle: A study of business-to-business relationships. *Industrial Marketing Management, 44*, 119–130. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.indmarman.2014.10.016

Dwyer, F. R., Schurr, P. H., & Oh, S. (1987). Developing Buyer-Seller Relationships. *Journal of Marketing, 51*(2), 11–27. https://doi.org/10.1177/002224298705100202

Dyer, J. H., & Singh, H. (1998). The Relational View: Cooperative Strategy and Sources of Interorganizational Competitive Advantage. *The Academy of Management Review, 23*(4), 660. https://doi.org/10.2307/259056

Elbert, R., Tränkner, C., Özsucu, Ö., & Gleser, M. (2018). Incentive for information sharing through revenue-sharing contracts in a logistics service provider and customer relationship. *International Journal of Integrated Supply Management, 12*(1/2), 143–165. https://doi.org/10.1504/ IJISM.2018.095700

Evans, J. B., & Schilke, O. (2024). The Power to Reward vs. the Power to Punish: The Influence of Power Framing on Individual-Level Exploration. Organization Science, 35(1), 346–363. https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2023.1672

Fornell, C., & Larcker, D. F. (1981). Evaluating structural equation models with unobservable variables and measurement error. *Journal of Marketing Research, 18*(1), Article 1. https://doi.org/10.1177/002224378101800104

Gaski, J. F. (1984). The Theory of Power and Conflict in Channels of Distribution. *Journal of Marketing, 48*(3), 9–29. https://doi.org/10.1177/002224298404800303

Gelderman, C. J., Semeijn, J., & Verhappen, M. (2020). Buyer opportunism in strategic supplier relationships: Triggers, manifestations and consequences. *Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management, 26*(2), 100581. https://doi.org/10. 1016/j.pursup.2019.100581

Glas, A. H. (2018). The impact of procurement on supplier satisfaction: Service, communication, and speed. *International Journal of Integrated Supply Management, 12*(1/2), 90–117. https://doi.org/10.1504/IJISM.2018.095687

Griffith, D. A., Harvey, M. G., & Lusch, R. F. (2006). Social exchange in supply chain relationships: The resulting benefits of procedural and distributive justice. *Journal of Operations Management, 24*(2), 85–98. https://doi.org/10. 1016/j.jom.2005.03.003

Guenther, P., Guenther, M., Ringle, C. M., Zaefarian, G., & Cartwright, S. (2023). Improving PLS-SEM use for business marketing research. *Industrial Marketing Management, 111*, 127–142. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.indmarman.2023.03.010

Ha, B., Park, Y., & Cho, S. (2011). Suppliers' affective trust and trust in competency in buyers: Its effect on collaboration and logistics efficiency. *International Journal of Operations & Production Management, 31*(1), 56–77. https://doi.org/10. 1108/01443571111098744

Hair, J. F., Howard, M. C., & Nitzl, C. (2020). Assessing measurement model quality in PLS-SEM using confirmatory composite analysis. *Journal of Business Research, 109*, 101–110. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusres.2019.11.069

Hair, J. F., Hult, G. T. M., Ringle, C. M., & Sarstedt, M. (2022). *A primer on partial least squares structural equation modeling (PLS-SEM)* (Third edition). SAGE.

Hair, J. F., Ringle, C. M., & Sarstedt, M. (2011). PLS-SEM: Indeed a silver bullet. *Journal of Marketing Theory and Practice, 19*(2), Article 2. https://doi.org/10/dxph3f

Hair, J. F., Risher, J. J., Sarstedt, M., & Ringle, C. M. (2019). When to use and how to report the results of PLS-SEM. *European Business Review, 31*(1), Article 1. https://doi.org/ 10.1108/EBR-11-2018-0203

Han, Z., Handfield, R. B., Huo, B., & Tian, Y. (2022). Effects of power use in buyer–supplier relationships: The moderating role of communication. *Industrial Marketing Management, 102*, 45–57. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.indmarman.2022.01. 001

Handfield, R. B., & Bechtel, C. (2004). Trust, power, dependence, and economics: Can SCM research borrow paradigms? *International Journal of Integrated Supply Management, 1*(1), 3–32. https://doi.org/10.1504/IJISM.2004.004595

Handley, S. M., & Benton, W. C. (2012). The influence of exchange hazards and power on opportunism in outsourcing relationships. *Journal of Operations Management, 30*(1–2), 55–68. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jom.2011.06.001

Handley, S. M., deJong, J., & Benton, W. C. (2019). How Service Provider Dependence Perceptions Moderate the Power–Opportunism Relationship with Professional Services. *Production and Operations Management, 28*(7), 1692–1715. https://doi.org/10.1111/poms.13013

Hayes, A. F. (2018). *Introduction to Mediation, Moderation, and Conditional Process Analysis: A Regression-Based Approach* (Second edition). Guilford Press.

Henseler, J., Ringle, C. M., & Sarstedt, M. (2015). A new criterion for assessing discriminant validity in variance-based structural equation modeling. *Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 43*(1), Article 1. https://doi.org/10.1007/ s11747-014-0403-8

Hulland, J. (1999). Use of partial least squares (PLS) in strategic management research: A review of four recent studies. *Strategic Management Journal, 20*(2), 195–204. https://doi.org/10.1002/(SICI)10970266(199902)20:2%253 C195::AID-SMJ13%253E3.0.CO;2-7

Huo, B., Flynn, B. B., & Zhao, X. (2017). Supply Chain Power Configurations and Their Relationship with Performance. *Journal of Supply Chain Management, 53*(2), 88–111. https://doi.org/10.1111/jscm.12139

Huo, B., Tian, M., Tian, Y., & Zhang, Q. (2019). The dilemma of inter-organizational relationships: Dependence, use of power and their impacts on opportunism. *International Journal of Operations & Production Management, 39*(1), 2–23. https://doi.org/10.1108/IJOPM-07-2017-0383

Jia, F., Wei, L., Jiang, L., Hu, Z., & Yang, Z. (2021). Curbing opportunism in marketing channels: The roles of influence strategy and perceived fairness. *Journal of Business Research, 131*, 69–80. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusres.2021. 03.039

Johnson, D., & Grayson, K. (2005). Cognitive and affective trust in service relationships. *Journal of Business Research, 58*(4), 500–507. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0148-2963(03)00140-1

Johnston, D. A., McCutcheon, D. M., Stuart, F. I., & Kerwood, H. (2004). Effects of supplier trust on performance of cooperative supplier relationships. *Journal of Operations Management, 22*(1), 23–38. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jom.2003.12.001

Kahkonen, A.-K., & Lintukangas, K. (2014). Dyadic Relationships and Power within a Supply Network Context. *Operations and Supply Chain Management: An International Journal, 3*(2), 59–69. https://doi.org/10.31387/ oscm070040

Khoja, F., Adams, J., & Kauffman, R. (2011). The inside story of relationship development: Power asymmetry in a buyer supplier relationship. *International Journal of Integrated Supply Management, 6*(1), 73–91. https://doi.org/10.1504/IJISM.2011.038333

Kim, D. Y., Fortado, B., & Misra, S. C. (2024). Supply chain interdependence: A systematic review of the empirical evidence. *International Journal of Integrated Supply Management, 17*(1), 73–99. https://doi.org/10.1504/IJISM.2024.135417

Kim, S., & Lee, C. (2024). Study Examines Role of Collaboration-Enhancing Factors in Supply Chain. *Operations and Supply Chain Management: An International Journal*, 77–88. https://doi.org/10.31387/oscm0560415

Kock, N., & Lynn, G. (2012). Lateral Collinearity and Misleading Results in Variance-Based SEM: An Illustration and Recommendations. *Journal of the Association for Information Systems, 13*(7), 546–580. https://doi.org/10.17705/1jais.00302

Kwon, I. G., & Suh, T. (2004). Factors Affecting the Level of Trust and Commitment in Supply Chain Relationships. *Journal of Supply Chain Management, 40*(1), 4–14. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-493X.2004.tb00165.x

Lee, C., & Kim, S. (2023). Impact of Information Sharing on Trust and Commitment Level in the Supply Chain: Focus on Korea's Three New Core Industries. *Operations and Supply Chain Management: An International Journal*, 17–24. https://doi.org/10.31387/oscm0520369

Lee, C.-H., Son, B.-G., & Roden, S. (2023). Supply chain disruption response and recovery: The role of power and governance. *Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management, 29*(5), 100866. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pursup.2023.100866

Leonidou, L. C., Aykol, B., Spyropoulou, S., & Christodoulides, P. (2019). The power roots and drivers of infidelity in international business relationships. *Industrial Marketing Management, 78*, 198–212. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.indmarman.2017.03.003

Liu, G., Aroean, L., & Ko, W. W. (2022). Power, shared goals and supplier flexibility: A study of the HUB-and-spoke supply chain. *International Journal of Operations & Production Management, 42*(2), 182–205. https://doi.org/10.1108/IJOPM-08-2021-0538

Liu, Y.-H. S., Deligonul, S., Cavusgil, E., & Chiou, J.-S. (2018). Always trust in old friends? Effects of reciprocity in bilateral asset specificity on trust in international B2B partnerships. J*ournal of Business Research, 90*, 171–185. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusres.2018.05.012

Lumineau, F., & Oliveira, N. (2020). Reinvigorating the Study of Opportunism in Supply Chain Management. *Journal of Supply Chain Management, 56*(1), 73–87. https://doi.org/10.1111/jscm.12215

Luo, Y. (2006). Opportunism in Inter-firm Exchanges in Emerging Markets. *Management and Organization Review, 2*(1), 121–147. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1740-8784.2006. 00032.x

Luo, Y. (2007). An integrated anti-opportunism system in international exchange. *Journal of International Business Studies, 38*(6), 855–877. https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.jibs.8400300

Luo, Y., Liu, Y., Yang, Q., Maksimov, V., & Hou, J. (2015). Improving performance and reducing cost in buyer–supplier relationships: The role of justice in curtailing opportunism. *Journal of Business Research, 68*(3), 607–615. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusres.2014.08.011

Mayer, R. C., Davis, J. H., & Schoorman, F. D. (1995). An Integrative Model of Organizational Trust. *The Academy of Management Review, 20*(3), 709. https://doi.org/10.2307/258792

Nguyen, N. T. D., Phat, N. H., Mai, N. T. H., & Lan, H. T. P. (2022). Can Supply Chain Collaboration Improve Firm Performance? Experiences on Leather and Footwear Companies in Vietnam. *Operations and Supply Chain Management: An International Journal*, 551–564. https://doi.org/10.31387/oscm0510366

Podsakoff, P. M., MacKenzie, S. B., Lee, J.-Y., & Podsakoff, N. P. (2003). Common method biases in behavioral research: A critical review of the literature and recommended remedies. *Journal of Applied Psychology, 88*(5), 879–903. https://doi.org/10.1037/0021-9010.88.5.879

Pulles, N. J., Veldman, J., Schiele, H., & Sierksma, H. (2014). Pressure or Pamper? The Effects of Power and Trust Dimensions on Supplier Resource Allocation. *Journal of Supply Chain Management, 50*(3), 16–36. https://doi.org/10.1111/jscm.12049

Rehman, A. U., Ahmed, A., Mahmood, A., Maqbool, Z., & Iqbal, M. (2023). Impact of Buyer's Ethical Environment on Supplier's Performance: A Trust-based Mediation Model. *Operations and Supply Chain Management: An International Journal*, 279–292. https://doi.org/10.31387/ oscm0530389

Robb, C., Kang, M., & Stephens, A. (2022). The effects of dynamism, relational capital, and ambidextrous innovation on the supply chain resilience of U.S. firms amid COVID-19. *Operations and Supply Chain Management: An International Journal*, 1–16. https://doi.org/10.31387/ oscm0480326

Sarstedt, M., Hair, J. F., Nitzl, C., Ringle, C. M., & Howard, M. C. (2020). Beyond a tandem analysis of SEM and PROCESS: Use of PLS-SEM for mediation analyses! *International Journal of Market Research, 62*(3), 288–299. https://doi.org/10.1177/1470785320915686

Siawsh, N., Peszynski, K., Young, L., & Vo-Tran, H. (2021). Exploring the role of power on procurement and supply chain management systems in a humanitarian organisation: A socio-technical systems view. *International Journal of Production Research, 59*(12), 3591–3616. https://doi.org/10.1080/00207543.2019.1634293

Skowronski, K., Benton, W. C., & Handley, S. (2022). The moderating influence of supplier culture on the relationship between buyer power and supplier shirking. *Journal of Operations Management, 68*(3), 270–301. https://doi.org/10.1002/joom.1178

Skowronski, K., Benton, W. C., & Hill, J. A. (2020). Perceived supplier opportunism in outsourcing relationships in emerging economies. *Journal of Operations Management, 66*(7–8), 989–1023. https://doi.org/10.1002/joom.1123

Spekman, R. E., Kamauff, J. W., & Myhr, N. (1998). An empirical investigation into supply chain management: A perspective on partnerships. *Supply Chain Management: An International Journal, 3*(2), 53–67. https://doi.org/10.1108/13598549810215379

Taha, A., & Reynolds, P. (2023). Power in Third-Party Logistics. *Operations and Supply Chain Management: An International Journal, 16*(3), 352–364. https://doi.org/10.31387/oscm0540395

Terpend, R., & Ashenbaum, B. (2012). The Intersection of Power, Trust and Supplier Network Size: Implications for Supplier Performance. *Journal of Supply Chain Management, 48*(3), 52–77. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-493X.2011.03261.x

Trada, S., & Goyal, V. (2020). Tripartite role of communications in channel relationships: Mitigating exchange hazards, reducing opportunism, and curtailing its ill effects on relationship performance. *Industrial Marketing Management, 85*, 281–294. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.indmarman.2019.11. 015

V. Talavera, M. G. (2014). Supply Chain Collaboration and Trust in the Philippines. *Operations and Supply Chain Management: An International Journal, 7*(1), 1–12. https://doi.org/10.31387/oscm0160099

Van Selm, M., & Jankowski, N. W. (2006). Conducting Online Surveys. *Quality and Quantity, 40*(3), Article 3. https://doi.org/10/ckdk9j

Vos, F. G. S., Van Der Lelij, R., Schiele, H., & Praas, N. H. J. (2021). Mediating the impact of power on supplier satisfaction: Do buyer status and relational conflict matter? *International Journal of Production Economics, 239*, 108168. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijpe.2021.108168

Wang, Z., Huo, B., Tian, Y., & Hua, Z. (2015). Effects of external uncertainties and power on opportunism in supply chains: Evidence from China. *International Journal of Production Research, 53*(20), 6294–6307. https://doi.org/10.1080/00207543.2015.1053578

Williamson, O. E. (1985). *The economic institutions of capitalism: Firms, markets, relational contracting*. Free Press ; Collier Macmillan.

Williamson, O. E. (1993). Opportunism and its critics. *Managerial and Decision Economics, 14*(2), 97–107. https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4090140203

Yeung, J. H. Y., Selen, W., Zhang, M., & Huo, B. (2009). The effects of trust and coercive power on supplier integration. *International Journal of Production Economics, 120*(1), 66–78. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijpe.2008.07.014

Zhang, M., & Huo, B. (2013). The impact of dependence and trust on supply chain integration. *International Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics Management, 43*(7), 544–563. https://doi.org/10.1108/IJPDLM-10-2011-0171

Zhang, M., Zhao, X., Huo, B., & Flynn, B. (2022). The impact of power and relationship commitment on customer integration: A replication and extension. *International Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics Management, 52*(3), 238–260. https://doi.org/10.1108/IJPDLM-04-2021-0121

Zhang, Q., Pan, J., Xu, D., & Feng, T. (2020). Balancing coercive and non-coercive powers to enhance green supplier integration: Do relationship commitment and closeness matter? *Supply Chain Management: An International Journal, 25*(6), 637–653. https://doi.org/10.1108/SCM-03-2019-0140

Zhao, D., Gu, F. F., & Wang, L. (2022). The impact of contractual governance on forms of opportunism. *Industrial Marketing Management, 102*, 89–103. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.indmarman. 2022.01.006

Zhao, D., Wang, L., & Gu, F. F. (2021). Reconsidering network embeddedness: Effects on different forms of opportunism. *Journal of Business Research, 131*, 12–24. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusres.2021.03.029

Zhao, X., Huo, B., Flynn, B. B., & Yeung, J. H. Y. (2008). The impact of power and relationship commitment on the integration between manufacturers and customers in a supply chain. *Journal of Operations Management, 26*(3), 368–388. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jom.2007.08.002

Zou, Q., & Wang, Y. (2022). Understanding opportunism in buyer–supplier–supplier triadic relationships: The role of power asymmetry. *Management Decision, 60*(11), 2952–2971. https://doi.org/10.1108/MD-05-2021-0654

Thoa Xuan Thi Pham is a lecturer and Head of the Department of International Business at the Faculty of Business and Law, FPT University, Hanoi, Vietnam. She received her Ph.D. in Business Administration from Yokohama National University, Japan. Her research interests include behavioral operations and supply chain management, sustainable supply chain management, and supply chain innovation. Her current research focuses on relational mechanisms that mitigate opportunistic behavior in business-to-business exchanges within manufacturing supply chains. Her work has been published in peer-reviewed journals such as *Operations Management Research*, *Supply Chain Forum: An International Journal*, *Operations and Supply Chain Management: An International Journal*, *International Journal of Industrial Engineering and Operations Management*, and *International Journal of Innovation Science*.

Nguyen Ngoc Anh is a faculty member at the Faculty of Economics and Management, VNU International School, Vietnam National University Hanoi, Vietnam. He received his Ph.D. in Business Administration from Yokohama National University, Japan. His research focuses on operations, logistics and supply chain management, organizational learning and innovation, with publications in peer-reviewed journals including *Operations Management Research*, *Supply Chain Forum: An International Journal*, *Operations and Supply Chain Management: An International Journal*, *International Journal of Industrial Engineering and Operations Management*, and *International Journal of Innovation Science*. He is a member of the Production and Operations Management Society (POMS), the European Operations Management Association (EurOMA), and the Japanese Operations Management and Strategy Association (JOMSA).